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Abstract: We examine the short-run impact of the Canterbury earthquakes (4/9/2010, and 
22/2/2011) on the New Zealand economy using VAR macro-models. Maybe surprisingly, we 
find little evidence of a pronounced impact on the aggregate economy. Our results suggest 
that the earthquakes reduced CPI inflation moderately, and the first earthquake had a small 
but short-lived, adverse effect on real gross domestic product (GDP) growth. At the very 
worse, it appears that policies (by the government and the Reserve Bank) have been 
successful in mitigating any serious adverse impact. The more significant impact of the 
earthquakes is to be found at the regional level. 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate what were the effects of the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 
on the New Zealand economy. While the Canterbury earthquakes have gained a lot of 
media attention due to the disruption and devastation they have caused, the impacts of the 
earthquakes on the New Zealand economy have not been studied in much detail.  
At this stage it is estimated that the cost of immediate damage is equivalent to more 
than 10 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). It is useful to compare 
this with the earthquake and tsunami which struck Japan in 2011. The cost of damage 
associated with the Japanese earthquake/tsunami/nuclear meltdown was equivalent to 
around 3 to 4 per cent of Japan’s GDP (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). The cost of immediate 
damage from the Canterbury earthquake was therefore about three times greater relative 
to the Japan event (which was the costliest disaster in modern history in absolute terms). 
The series of earthquakes in the Canterbury region began on the 4 September 2010. The 
first earthquake had a reported magnitude of 7.1 (Richter scale). While considerable 
damage was caused, no fatalities occurred.  Unfortunately, another earthquake with a 
magnitude of 6.3 struck Christchurch on 22 February 2011 (GNS science, 2011). Because of 
its location and characteristics, more damage was caused to infrastructure and buildings 
and 185 lives were lost (New Zealand Police, 2012). Widespread liquefaction also added to 
the damage of the earthquake.1  Combined, these two events led to about 400,000 
insurance claims for damages, including 80,000 housing units that were significantly 
damaged; the New Zealand government’s Earthquake Commission is expecting to pay about 
                                                             
1 The 22/2/2011 earthquake was located closer to the city of Christchurch (the second biggest city in New 
Zealand) and it occurred at 12.51 pm, around lunchtime on a weekday. The peak ground acceleration was very 
high since the epicentre of the earthquake was very shallow and therefore violent shaking was felt on the surface 
(Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, 2011). 
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$12 billion for these damages.2 There have been more than 3500 aftershocks in the 
Canterbury region, with a reported magnitude greater than 3.0 between 3 September 2010 
and 18 September 2012, with more than 50 above 5.0 (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). New 
Zealand has a long history of destructive earthquakes, most notably in the Wairarapa in 
1855, and Hawke’s Bay (Napier) in 1931.  The recent earthquakes which occurred in 
Christchurch, however, were largely unexpected since they occurred in a previously 
unknown fault.  
Here, we aim to examine the aftermath of these destructive events and their impact on 
the New Zealand national economy. The scale of this event, relative to the size of the New 
Zealand economy, should enable us to clearly identify the ways in which a large exogenous 
and unexpected destructive shock affects a high-income economy. In the next section, we 
discuss the existing literature. Section three adds more details about Christchurch and the 
data used. We next set out the methodology and present our empirical conclusions. The last 
section puts these findings in context, identifies some limitations of this study, and also 
provides some suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The economic literature on disasters distinguishes between the direct destructive 
effects of these events, and their indirect impact—both in the short- and in the longer-
term.3 The investigation of the direct effects (e.g., Kahn, 2004) is not of direct relevance to 
our investigation, and nor is the much more limited literature on the longer-term effects 
(e.g., Cavallo et al., 2013).  
                                                             
2 About 40% of this sum was re-insured (mostly in Europe) and the rest will be covered by the EQC savings 
from previous years and about 1 billion is to be covered by government, as the last insurer (data from a public 
talk by Ian Simpson, Chief Executive of the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, 1/3/2013. 
3
 Cavallo and Noy (2011) provide context and background to these distinctions. 
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The earlier literature on the short-run effects of natural disasters, in particular the 
seminal work of Albala-Bertrand (1993), generally identifies evidence for positive impact on 
GDP but adverse effects on both the government and the trade and current accounts. The 
basic mechanism that appears to explain this observation is that the destruction reduces the 
stock of goods available (rather than a flow) while it also leads to increased spending on 
reconstruction (a flow).  
These arguments fit well within the conventional wisdom that countries/regions 
recover rapidly from exogenous adverse shocks to the capital stock since the most 
important asset in such economies is not physical but human capital; both Adam Smith 
(1776) and John S. Mill (1872) included descriptions of such dynamics in their seminal books.  
Research in the past decade, however, is less sanguine about the impact of these 
events, both in the short- and longer-term. This recent research mostly focuses on 
developing countries, and especially small island states that appear to be especially 
vulnerable to disasters (e.g., Rasmussen, 2004, and Heger et al., 2010). Noy (2009), for 
example, finds that the short-run adverse impact of disasters is more significant in smaller 
economies.4 More recent work that reaches similar conclusions includes Strobl (2012) who 
uses more detailed measurements for disaster data and a different identification technique 
and von Peter et al. (2012) who investigate the importance of insurance in ameliorating 
these adverse dynamics. 
 New Zealand is a high-income economy (income per capita of about PPP US$30,000)5, 
and most of the research that investigate the impact of disasters stress that their 
conclusions about adverse short-term impacts are relevant for middle- and low-income 
                                                             
4 Noy (2009) finds that middle- and low- income countries with a higher literacy rate, better institutions, higher 
per capita income, higher degree of openness to trade, and higher levels of government spending are in a 
better position to deal with the initial negative shock and prevent further spillovers into the macro-economy. 
5
 World Development Indicators 2011. 
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countries only. Few events in higher-income countries in recent decades have been big 
enough to generate any observable impact at the national level. Notable exception may be 
the Kobe 1995 earthquake (Japan), Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (New Orleans) and more 
recently the 2010 Bío Bío earthquake (Chile) and the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 
(Japan).  
Horwich (2000) examines the 1995 Kobe (Japan) earthquake, and finds that it had little 
observable macroeconomic consequences for Japan. Following Kobe’s earthquake in 1995, 
real GDP increased by 0.2 % for the first quarter—when the earthquake happened. For the 
subsequent two quarters, real GDP increased by 1.3 %, and then 2.3 % in the last quarter of 
that year. Moreover, the real growth rate for 1995 was 1.4% compared to 0.6 % for the 
previous year (Horwich, 2000). Similarly, the devastation caused by hurricane Katrina had no 
observable impact on the aggregate U.S. economy.  
Another reason that the national income accounts will not show much impact from a 
catastrophic natural disaster is that production increases due to replacement capital, 
disaster related rescue, and other factors associated with helping in the clean-up and 
rehabilitation processes. Hallegate and Dumas (2009) also notes that adverse shocks can 
trigger re-investment and upgrading of capital stock, which in turn can lead to positive 
impacts on an economy. In a similar vein, the New Zealand Treasury is predicting that the 
sequence of Canterbury earthquakes in 2010-2011 will have a positive effect on economic 
activity once rebuilding gets underway (New Zealand Treasury, 2012). 
The literature on the regional impacts of natural disasters, even in developed 
economies is less extensive, and in this case most papers identify some adverse impacts 
which may potentially persist for a long time (e.g., Vigdor, 2008, Coffman and Noy, 2012, 
duPont and Noy, 2013). Following Hurricane Katrina which struck New Orleans in August 
6 
 
2005, unemployment rose. This was reflected in the reduction of the payroll of private-
sector firms located in New Orleans metropolitan area, which was estimated to have fallen 
by 13.6 percent between July 2005 and July 2007 (Vigdor, 2008).  Almost 70,000 jobs were 
lost. The largest reduction in percentage terms was in service related industries, such as 
education and health, and leisure and hospitality. Conversely, there was an increase in 
employment in mining and construction (Vigdor, 2008). 
The studies done so far on the Canterbury earthquakes have been more focussed on 
specific sectors. The Canterbury earthquakes have benefited some sectors of the economy 
and adversely affected others. For example, the initial clean-up activity and reconstruction is 
boosting demand in sectors such as utilities, construction, safety, healthcare and social 
assistance (Eaqub, 2011). However, reduction in population and aggregate employment 
remain notable. The region’s population has decreased by 5,000 over the year to June 2011 
and there have been 26,800 jobs losses over the year to September 2011 (Eaqub, 2011). 
Sectors particularly affected by the earthquakes in the Canterbury region were retail, 
hospitality and wholesale. Conversely, there has been a rise in employment in government 
and food manufacturing sectors (Eaqub, 2012). Not all job losses in the Canterbury region 
will affect unemployment at the national level, as some workers will move to other parts of 
the country. Eaqub (2012) also observes that economic activity in 2011 was 4% lower 
compared to 2010.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
Data was collected from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), Statistics New 
Zealand and BusinessNZ. Seasonally adjusted data was used when possible. The economic 
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variables used were quarterly real GDP growth rate (seasonally adjusted6), quarterly 
percentage change in gross fixed capital formation (general government and the private 
sector, both seasonally adjusted), the monthly difference for the 90-day interest rate, the 
quarterly percentage change in total exports and imports (both seasonally adjusted), the 
monthly percentage change in exchange rate measured by the trade-weighted index, CPI 
inflation, unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted), current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP, quarterly percentage change in consumption for the government 
(seasonally adjusted) and also for the private sector (seasonally adjusted), quarterly 
percentage change in total investment (seasonally adjusted), quarterly percentage change 
in New Zealand’s net international investment position (NIIP) (seasonally adjusted), the 
performance of manufacturing index (seasonally adjusted) and the quarterly percentage 
change in net migration (seasonally adjusted). The data collected is in both monthly (M) and 
quarterly (Q) frequencies, where appropriate. We used all available data from 1999. 
In 2010, a series of changes to policies were made in New Zealand which had direct 
effects on the consumer price index. For example, on the 1 October 2010 the GST rate rose 
from 12.5 % to 15 % (Inland Revenue, New Zealand, 2010). There was also a tax increase on 
tobacco in New Zealand on 28 April 2010. The excise rate for loose-leaf tobacco and factory 
made cigarettes increased by 24 % and 10 %, respectively (ASH New Zealand, 2010). The 
tobacco excise tax rose by a further 10 % on 1 January 2011, as well as on the 1 January 
2012 (ASH New Zealand, 2010).  Although these policy changes may not be completely 
independent from the first earthquake since they occurred after this event (with the 
exception of the initial tax increase on tobacco which occurred in April 2010), it is important 
that they are taken into consideration when assessing the effects of the earthquakes. 
                                                             
6
 We used GDP data collected using the production-based method following Statistics NZ recommendations. 
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4. Results  
4.1 Data Description: Figures 1-16 
Before we present our VAR results, we plot our macroeconomic series to establish 
some of the relevant trends in the periods before and after the Canterbury earthquakes, 
and assess whether the patterns in the New Zealand macroeconomic variables post-quakes 
appear different by historical standards. This analysis is purely observational and changes 
from the historical average around this time might not necessarily be directly related to the 
earthquakes. In section 4.2, the impact of the earthquakes on macroeconomic variables is 
estimated more systematically with macro VAR models. 
Figure 1 shows the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP growth rate as a function 
of time. The upper and lower horizontal lines in this figure (and elsewhere in this paper) 
represent 1.5 standard deviations from the average value for the control period, calculated 
using the baseline data from 2000 Q1 to 2007 Q4, for each of the variables considered.7 The 
only obvious outlier is the decline in GDP growth that is associated with the GFC. We 
observe more moderate declines that appear to be associated with both earthquakes, 
though in both cases the decline is still within the benchmark bounds.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of inflation; in the post 2009 data, we also account for 
two material policy changes, the increase in GST and the increase in cigarette taxes, as these 
both affected headline inflation.8  As can be observed, once we account for these policy 
changes, we find only a moderate increase in inflation after the first earthquake, whereas 
                                                             
7 In a few instances data was only available starting from a later date (after 2000 Q1), in which case we 
adjusted the baseline period.  
8 The adjusted CPI inflation excludes the direct impact of the increase in the rate of GST and the excise tax on 
tobacco, and the incorporation of stationary energy and liquid fuel sectors to the amended Emission Trading 
Scheme.  
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there is not much change from the average value around the time of the second 
earthquake.  
Figure 3 shows the current account balance (% of GDP). Here, it is apparent that the 
period in the lead up to the global crisis was exceptional, and the large deficits that were 
prominent in 2005-2008 disappeared after the onset of the crisis, and before the 
earthquakes. This representation, at least, does not suggest any impact of the quake. The 
unemployment rate, in Figure 4, and the 90-day interest rate, in figure 5, both show 
dramatic changes after the onset of the GFC, but no visible impact of the Canterbury 
earthquakes, except for the second (more destructive) earthquake and the market interest 
rate.9 
The percentage change in net international investment position for New Zealand 
(NIIP) is shown in figure 6. We observe a moderate increase after the first earthquake, 
followed by a more significant decline, and then a sharp increase after the second 
earthquake. A large part of the improvement reflected reinsurance inflows. According to 
Statistics New Zealand, as of 31 March 2011 New Zealand’s international assets were valued 
at $180.6 billion (Statistics New Zealand, 2011).  This was 17.0 percent higher than for 31 
March 2010. The financial and insurance services industry increased its international assets 
by 20.7 billion from the 31 March 2010, to $117.0 billion at 31 March 2011 (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2011). This increase is partly attributable to overseas reinsurance claims resulting 
from the Canterbury earthquakes (Statistics New Zealand, 2011).  However, this is likely to 
                                                             
9 After the second earthquake, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand lowered the official cash rate (OCR) from 3% 
to 2.5%. As mentioned in the monetary policy statement, this was done to lessen the economic impact of the 
earthquake since there was considerable damage done to infrastructure and buildings, as well as disruption to 
business activity and a likely deterioration in consumer and business confidence (Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, 2011).  
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only be a temporary improvement in the NIIP as much of this reinsurance money will have 
to be repatriated to pay claims on property damages resulting from the earthquakes. 
For consumption by the private sector, in figure 7, we observe a decrease after the 
first earthquake which falls outside the lower 1.5 STD bound. There is a sharp increase after 
the second earthquake, but this lies within the bounds. Government consumption is shown 
in figure 8; here we find no significant deviation from the average value around the time of 
the earthquakes. 
For investment, we reach no conclusions, as investment has typically been volatile. 
This also appears the case for imports, in Figure 10, and exports, in Figure 11. The exchange 
rate, remarkably, is extremely volatile in the period leading up and during the global crisis 
(2004-209), but has been quite stable in the post-crisis Canterbury earthquakes period of 
2010-2011. 
The Performance Manufacturing Index (PMI) is shown in figure 13. An observation 
above 50 denotes an expanding manufacturing sector, and we observe a slowdown but still 
expanding manufacturing after both large earthquakes. The index dropped significantly 
below 50 in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman collapse of 2008, and then again at the 
end of 2011, but this drop does not appear to be associated with the second Canterbury 
earthquake. 
One potential outcome of a large shock is for people to leave; there is a very 
dramatic increase in migration to New Zealand in the immediate aftermath of the global 
crisis, and more moderate declines that appear to be associated with both earthquakes. The 
increase in the number of people leaving in 2011 compared to previous years can be partly 
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explained by the 22 February 2011 earthquake, with evidence of some people wanting to 
leave because of this event.10 
Since we are, of course, interested here at the impact of the events at the national 
level, this data does not account for significant mobility within New Zealand, and some 
demographic changes in the Canterbury region that are clearly associated with the quakes. 
 For fixed capital formation by the private sector (Figure 15) and by the government 
(Figure 16) we again do not see any visible deviation from the average value during and 
after the time of the earthquakes. We do observe a very large decrease in private sector 
capital formation in the 2008 year of the GFC. 
 
4.2 Impulse Response Functions 
We estimate a set of structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) with identification 
obtained by placing restrictions on the contemporaneous correlation between the variables 
included in each of the three VAR models we estimate. Results for all three are presented in 
appendix tables A1-A3, as we are agnostic to what is the preferred model specification. To 
determine the appropriate number of lags, we examined the Akaike and Schwarz 
information criteria. In most cases, these tests selected VAR models with two lags, and we 
therefore consistently used two lags in our estimated models. 
Given the interactions between the various variables, and the potential indirect 
impact of the earthquakes, a clearer understanding of their direct and indirect impact is 
provided by examining the impulse response function. The impulse we are interested in is 
the occurrence of a disaster similar in magnitude to the earthquakes, and we trace the 
impact of both earthquakes on the macroeconomic variables included in our three 
                                                             
10
 A large number of people have moved to Australia: 30,500 in 2010/2011 compared to 16,700 in 2009/2010 
(Department of Labour, 2011, p.vi). 
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specifications discussed above. These results are presented in figures 17-19 and are 
described below.11 
 All of our three VAR models yield estimates of the national macroeconomic impact 
of the earthquakes that is almost never statistically significant at below the 5% level (the 
impulse response figures show the 2SD confidence interval). This lack of statistical 
significance may not be that surprising given the failure of other empirical models to identify 
much impact of natural disasters, adverse or otherwise, in high-income countries. However, 
several characteristics of these results are worth noting. 
 The first model includes real GDP growth, inflation, change in the unemployment 
rate, and change in the current account balance. The impulse responses suggest that, if they 
had any impact, both earthquakes decreased both New Zealand’s real GDP growth and 
inflation. There were no noticeable impacts on the current account and unemployment. The 
second model adds change in net migration, private consumption, and investment, and 
obtains similar results, with some indication that unemployment may have decreased 
somewhat, but with a significant lag. We note, however, that none of these observations 
are found to be statistically significant using the common thresholds.  
 The third model includes all the variables in model two, in addition to exports, 
imports, and government consumption. Again, none of the results are statistically 
significant, and besides some indication that the real GDP did indeed decrease, even our 
previous observation about inflation does not seem to persist. In short, we conclude that 
the Christchurch earthquake had no real observable macroeconomic impact at the national 
level, even with a horizon of several quarters. This result is somewhat surprising given the 
                                                             
11 In our VAR estimations, we include binary indicators for the two earthquakes and for the global financial 
crisis (Q3, 2008). We are not interested, however, in the global financial crisis per se, and therefore do not 
present the relevant impulse response functions. 
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exceptional magnitude of the event (in relative terms) for a developed high-income 
economy, and is in contrast to informal discussions of their impact. 
 
5. Discussion / limitations 
It is difficult to isolate the effects of the earthquakes from other macroeconomic 
shocks during the period under consideration. For example, while it was feasible to control 
for the immediate onset of the global financial crisis, as it peaked some time before the first 
earthquake, the GFC, and its most recent evolution into the Euro crisis, has had a continuing 
impact on economies around the world.  There have also been offsetting shocks and policy 
changes that will mask the effects of the earthquakes. For example, it is possible that the 
expansive monetary policy embarked on by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand offset some of 
the effects of the shock, and that a favourable terms-of-trade environment (especially high 
agricultural export prices) also contributed to a rapid New Zealand recovery; without these 
countervailing forces, the New Zealand economy could have suffered worse.12 While we 
have attempted to control for the counterfactual, a VAR estimated over a 10 year period will 
only be able to do that imperfectly. 
Maybe the biggest drawback of our study is that we are missing the regional impact. 
The data, for example, suggest that there have been large changes in employment in the 
Canterbury region. Both the Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) and the Quarterly 
Employment Survey (QES) showed that employment in the Canterbury region dropped by 
about 5% as of the last quarter of 2012; with those working part-time, youth, females and 
workers in the retail trade and accommodation industries most affected (Statistics New 
                                                             
12 The only important export sector that was clearly hurt by the earthquakes was international tourism. 
Christchurch was a major tourist destination, and all of the main attractions in the city centre, as well as most 
hotels, have been destroyed (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012).  
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Zealand, 2011).  Over the next few years, these changes will be masked in aggregate 
employment numbers by increased employment in the construction industry. This sector 
has increased employment in the Canterbury region by 25% from June 2010, just before the 
first earthquake, to June 2012 (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012).  These changes also manifested 
in a demographic change: an increase in the number of young males and a decrease in the 
number of somewhat older males and females and small children. We leave a detailed 
investigation into the regional short- and long-term impact of the Canterbury earthquakes 
for future work. 
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Figure 1: Quarterly real gross domestic product growth rate (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Figure 2: CPI inflation before and after policy adjustments (darker line) 
 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
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Figure 3: Current account balance (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
Figure 4: Unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 5: Monthly difference in 90-day interest rate 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
Figure 6: Quarterly percentage change in net international investment position (seasonally 
adjusted) 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 7: Quarterly percentage change in private consumption (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
Figure 8: Quarterly percentage change in government consumption (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand  
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Figure 9:  Quarterly percentage change in total investment (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
Figure 10: Quarterly percentage change in total imports as a function of time (seasonally 
adjusted) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
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Figure 11: Quarterly percentage change in exports (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
Figure 12: Monthly percentage change in trade weighted index 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
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Figure 13: Performance manufacturing index (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: BusinessNZ 
 
Figure 14: Percentage change in net migration (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 15: Percentage change in gross fixed capital formation (private sector, seasonally 
adjusted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
Figure 16: Percentage change in gross fixed capital formation (general government, 
seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 17: VAR 1 
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Figure 18: VAR 2 
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Figure 19: VAR 3 
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Appendix Table 1A 
     
     
 t-statistics in [ ] VAR 1    
 Real GDP growth rate       Inflation F.D u.r  F.D c.a.b (% of GDP) 
     
Real GDP growth rate (-1)  0.214011 -0.099304 -0.109229 -0.051397 
 [ 1.31635] [-0.78397] [-1.65873] [-0.34911] 
Real GDP growth rate (-2) -0.143676 -0.381371 -0.023954 -0.390621 
 [-0.84137] [-2.86647] [-0.34632] [-2.52613] 
Inflation (-1) -0.392148  0.864267 -0.071748 -0.232410 
 [-2.36638] [ 6.69389] [-1.06893] [-1.54877] 
Inflation (-2)  0.112253 -0.303186  0.110006  0.228123 
 [ 0.68670] [-2.38052] [ 1.66145] [ 1.54111] 
F.D unemployment rate
13
 (-1)  0.069224  0.645453 -0.337762 -0.417549 
 [ 0.17620] [ 2.10868] [-2.12258] [-1.17369] 
F.D unemployment rate (-2)  0.013559  0.991950  0.294723  0.132627 
 [ 0.03655] [ 3.43172] [ 1.96130] [ 0.39478] 
F.D c.a.b (% of GDP) (-1)  0.045593 -0.435099  0.216792  0.501978 
 [ 0.26290] [-3.22016] [ 3.08631] [ 3.19650] 
F.D c.a.b (% of GDP) (-2)  0.206617  0.191177 -0.261874 -0.196771 
 [ 1.21522] [ 1.44318] [-3.80264] [-1.27805] 
C  1.457567  1.692025 -0.037824  0.256386 
 [ 2.96792] [ 4.42209] [-0.19015] [ 0.57652] 
D1 -1.191317 -1.108486  0.104051 -0.162596 
 [-2.31693] [-2.76702] [ 0.49961] [-0.34921] 
D2 -0.306748 -0.557921 -0.025086 -0.157216 
 [-0.83911] [-1.95886] [-0.16942] [-0.47493] 
D3 -1.141889 -1.578715  0.205119  0.387068 
 [-2.42929] [-4.31079] [ 1.07737] [ 0.90937] 
 R-squared  0.517632  0.786024  0.616887  0.637144 
 Adj. R-squared  0.356843  0.714699  0.489183  0.516192 
 Sum sq. resids  11.01409  6.685836  1.806930  9.031403 
 S.E. equation  0.577720  0.450112  0.233999  0.523143 
 F-statistic  3.219322  11.02029  4.830594  5.267744 
Log likelihood -32.18378 -20.95213  8.486017 -27.71825 
Akaike AIC  1.963723  1.464539  0.156177  1.765256 
Schwarz SC  2.445500  1.946316  0.637954  2.247032 
Mean dependent  0.551661  2.582222  0.008889  0.042222 
S.D. dependent  0.720375  0.842693  0.327402  0.752115 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  0.000691    
Determinant resid covariance  0.000200    
Log likelihood -63.75496    
Akaike information criterion  4.966887    
Schwarz criterion  6.893994    
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
13 F.D, c.a.b, cons. government, cons. private, u.r, investment and migration, represent first difference, current 
account balance, consumption government (% change), consumption private (% change), unemployment rate, 
investment (% change in total investment) and net migration (% change), respectively.  
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Appendix Table 1B 
t-statistics in [ ] VAR 2       
 
F.D 
unemployment 
rate 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
% change in 
private 
consumption 
% change in 
net migration  Investment Inflation 
F.D c.a.b (% of 
GDP) 
F.D u.r (-1) -0.261151  0.208115  0.209597 -32.53521  0.792625  0.711778 -0.723289 
 [-1.33486] [ 0.40677] [ 0.26480] [-0.38128] [ 0.36031] [ 1.78555] [-1.70493] 
F.D u.r (-2)  0.352329  0.053979 -0.225578 -78.79505 -1.542210  1.030478 -0.027938 
 [ 2.13038] [ 0.12481] [-0.33713] [-1.09232] [-0.82931] [ 3.05795] [-0.07790] 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) -0.100951  0.378181  0.439773 -45.34783  2.840050 -0.036205 -0.016626 
 [-1.15095] [ 1.64871] [ 1.23927] [-1.18534] [ 2.87965] [-0.20258] [-0.08742] 
Real GDP growth rate (-2) -0.003962 -0.127520  0.429599  66.00915  2.475065 -0.308498 -0.356388 
 [-0.04611] [-0.56755] [ 1.23588] [ 1.76144] [ 2.56198] [-1.76222] [-1.91292] 
Cons. private (-1)  0.039894 -0.016993 -0.094005  19.60029  0.057655 -0.114053  0.047253 
 [ 0.63723] [-0.10379] [-0.37113] [ 0.71777] [ 0.08190] [-0.89408] [ 0.34807] 
Cons. private (-2) -0.119056 -0.040564 -0.276693  8.659212 -1.070461  0.034341  0.072674 
 [-1.84114] [-0.23987] [-1.05760] [ 0.30701] [-1.47222] [ 0.26064] [ 0.51828] 
Migration (-1)  0.000433  0.000873  0.000601 -0.242969  0.005448 -0.000479  0.002092 
 [ 1.08672] [ 0.83795] [ 0.37297] [-1.39836] [ 1.21628] [-0.59044] [ 2.42150] 
Migration (-2) -0.000511 -0.000398 -0.000518 -0.169121 -0.005269  0.000221  0.000500 
 [-1.07250] [-0.31936] [-0.26858] [-0.81326] [-0.98287] [ 0.22743] [ 0.48318] 
Investment (-1)  0.010238 -0.042166 -0.035884  13.81715 -0.724824 -0.015083  0.021872 
 [ 0.70451] [-1.10952] [-0.61033] [ 2.17990] [-4.43584] [-0.50938] [ 0.69409] 
Investment (-2)  0.003654 -0.017462 -0.026298  0.196134 -0.347024 -0.025860 -0.020270 
 [ 0.27597] [-0.50435] [-0.49097] [ 0.03397] [-2.33115] [-0.95862] [-0.70608] 
Inflation (-1) -0.023804 -0.399609 -0.284719 -1.208976 -3.548928  0.777653 -0.055794 
 [-0.28641] [-1.83848] [-0.84670] [-0.03335] [-3.79741] [ 4.59191] [-0.30957] 
Inflation (-2)  0.040056  0.008642 -0.225768  91.66638  0.891087 -0.273053  0.136659 
 [ 0.49304] [ 0.04067] [-0.68686] [ 2.58681] [ 0.97544] [-1.64947] [ 0.77571] 
F.D c.a.b (% of GDP) (-1)  0.231571  0.027849  0.486666  38.41832  0.431851 -0.446618  0.508404 
 [ 3.02098] [ 0.13892] [ 1.56922] [ 1.14906] [ 0.50103] [-2.85945] [ 3.05859] 
F.D c.a.b (% of GDP) (-2) -0.270015  0.189909 -0.351960 -38.71263 -0.288559  0.172697 -0.171422 
 [-3.57098] [ 0.96038] [-1.15049] [-1.17380] [-0.33939] [ 1.12090] [-1.04548] 
C  0.065894  1.759396  1.978417 -292.2430  6.810860  1.874468 -0.221679 
 [ 0.24418] [ 2.49303] [ 1.81205] [-2.48285] [ 2.24457] [ 3.40899] [-0.37883] 
D1  0.067039 -1.195763 -1.250538  77.44832  0.109352 -1.201776  0.213643 
 [ 0.28325] [-1.93190] [-1.30595] [ 0.75023] [ 0.04109] [-2.49199] [ 0.41627] 
D2 -0.130919 -0.458140 -0.485487  52.40122 -3.220144 -0.604452  0.243518 
 [-0.67523] [-0.90353] [-0.61889] [ 0.61962] [-1.47702] [-1.53000] [ 0.57920] 
D3  0.159983 -1.382015 -0.440451  270.2699 -4.584544 -1.708378  0.670812 
 [ 0.71520] [-2.36248] [-0.48668] [ 2.77009] [-1.82271] [-3.74820] [ 1.38295] 
 R-squared  0.687599  0.558673  0.378259  0.562000  0.734378  0.804218  0.721639 
 Adj. R-squared  0.490902  0.280800 -0.013208  0.286223  0.567134  0.680949  0.546374 
 Sum sq. resids  1.473423  10.07700  24.11859  280315.4  186.2932  6.117348  6.928346 
 S.E. equation  0.233605  0.610919  0.945136  101.8924  2.626737  0.475992  0.506562 
 F-statistic  3.495724  2.010535  0.966260  2.037875  4.391060  6.524046  4.117430 
Log likelihood  13.07693 -30.18308 -49.81944 -260.4349 -95.81707 -18.95272 -21.75380 
Akaike AIC  0.218803  2.141470  3.014198  12.37489  5.058536  1.642343 1.766836 
Schwarz SC  0.941468  2.864135  3.736863  13.09755  5.781201  2.365008 2.489501 
Mean dependent  0.008889  0.551661  0.680000  17.72712  0.582222  2.582222 0.042222 
S.D. dependent  0.327402  0.720375  0.938955  120.6036  3.992452  0.842693 0.752115 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8.435194       
Determinant resid covariance  0.236131       
Log likelihood -414.4899       
Akaike information criterion  24.02177       
Schwarz criterion  29.08043       
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Appendix Table 1C 
 t-statistics in [ ]                  VAR 3 
 
Cons. 
(government) 
Cons. (private) Exports Imports 
F.D c.a.b (% of 
GDP) 
F.D u.r Inflation Investment Migration 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
Cons. government (-1) -0.224254 -0.186770  0.231678 -0.503170  0.048361  0.058170  0.240919  0.140336  12.21283 -0.159902 
 [-0.91446] [-0.77788] [ 0.39793] [-0.83764] [ 0.38282] [ 1.00602] [ 2.11072] [ 0.26255] [ 0.48018] [-1.04931] 
Cons. government (-2)  0.083786  0.006441 -0.044144  0.317019  0.006835  0.011767 -0.046499  0.564302  0.685918  0.022771 
 [ 0.47509] [ 0.03730] [-0.10543] [ 0.73385] [ 0.07523] [ 0.28299] [-0.56648] [ 1.46800] [ 0.03750] [ 0.20778] 
Cons. private (-1) -0.166495 -0.187079  0.465002  0.453306  0.041842  0.076251 -0.117291  0.347993  18.75852 -0.061146 
 [-0.56612] [-0.64970] [ 0.66597] [ 0.62924] [ 0.27618] [ 1.09960] [-0.85686] [ 0.54286] [ 0.61499] [-0.33458] 
Cons. private (-2) -0.276594 -0.386568 -0.893830  0.162206  0.054073 -0.098427  0.145118 -0.896269 11.08351 -0.145335 
 [-0.88583] [-1.26448] [-1.20575] [ 0.21208] [ 0.33617] [-1.33691] [ 0.99852] [-1.31691] [ 0.34225] [-0.74904] 
Exports (-1) -0.201951  0.032578 -0.374553 -0.065636  0.061355 -0.007800  0.041841 -0.457086 -5.331420 -0.034153 
 [-1.96874] [ 0.32437] [-1.53798] [-0.26122] [ 1.16108] [-0.32248] [ 0.87635] [-2.04433] [-0.50112] [-0.53579] 
Exports (-2) -0.085748 -0.001949 -0.171391  0.172059  0.039440 -0.022206  0.096605  0.215085 -7.920684 -0.025209 
 [-0.77655] [-0.01803] [-0.65377] [ 0.63612] [ 0.69335] [-0.85291] [ 1.87964] [ 0.89364] [-0.69162] [-0.36739] 
Imports (-1)  0.058983 -0.028425  0.021748 -0.547986  0.015377 -0.002978 -0.013561  0.536683 -12.15366  0.012753 
 [ 0.70401] [-0.34653] [ 0.10934] [-2.67021] [ 0.35628] [-0.15074] [-0.34775] [ 2.93889] [-1.39870] [ 0.24496] 
Imports (-2) -0.013341 -0.096202 -0.242646 -0.190599 -0.048458  0.012826 -0.014813  0.395738 -9.073653 -0.046202 
 [-0.17485] [-1.28778] [-1.33950] [-1.01980] [-1.23287] [ 0.71292] [-0.41711] [ 2.37955] [-1.14662] [-0.97446] 
F.D c.a.b  (-1) (% of GDP)  0.318638  0.303194 -0.240934  1.266189  0.320340  0.262798 -0.573486  2.266395  37.93286  0.082515 
 [ 0.70952] [ 0.68955] [-0.22597] [ 1.15102] [ 1.38468] [ 2.48181] [-2.74360] [ 2.31532] [ 0.81441] [ 0.29568] 
F.D c.a.b (-2) (% of GDP) -0.197329 -0.195425 -0.293880 -0.045100 -0.068918 -0.257602  0.223782 -2.384761 -12.62758  0.145487 
 [-0.47009] [-0.47549] [-0.29488] [-0.04386] [-0.31871] [-2.60265] [ 1.14536] [-2.60640] [-0.29005] [ 0.55775] 
F.D u.r(-1)  0.158497  0.243981 -0.606767  2.158372 -0.917498 -0.235390  0.443798 -1.075282 -10.81126  0.242007 
 [ 0.16482] [ 0.25913] [-0.26577] [ 0.91630] [-1.85211] [-1.03815] [ 0.99153] [-0.51301] [-0.10840] [ 0.40499] 
F.D u.r (-2) -0.061288 -0.282522  0.181913  2.147828 -0.120141  0.384399  1.009380 -2.041560 -60.70014  0.002833 
 [-0.08328] [-0.39211] [ 0.10412] [ 1.19150] [-0.31691] [ 2.21533] [ 2.94688] [-1.27276] [-0.79529] [ 0.00619] 
Inflation (-1) -0.245079 -0.373328  0.154597 -2.021661 -0.001566 -0.002406  0.945891 -3.353002  3.899248 -0.468360 
 [-0.60755] [-0.94524] [ 0.16142] [-2.04597] [-0.00754] [-0.02529] [ 5.03785] [-3.81343] [ 0.09320] [-1.86844] 
Inflation (-2) -0.074893 -0.399695 -1.730859 -1.813310  0.105465  0.039658 -0.270053  2.110943  54.71948 -0.075953 
 [-0.18252] [-0.99492] [-1.77680] [-1.80415] [ 0.49895] [ 0.40991] [-1.41404] [ 2.36030] [ 1.28583] [-0.29789] 
Investment (-1) -0.045942 -0.047470 -0.038478 -0.128012 0.028159 0.010591 0.023486 -0.796502 14.97441 -0.063282 
 [-0.62389] [-0.65841] [-0.22009] [-0.70968] [ 0.74229] [ 0.60998] [ 0.68522] [-4.96239] [ 1.96067] [-1.38293] 
Investment (-2)  0.064910 -0.010106 -0.199832 -0.147485 -0.007482  0.001280  0.001742 -0.488071  3.922903 -0.020193 
 [ 0.94582] [-0.15040] [-1.22647] [-0.87733] [-0.21164] [ 0.07912] [ 0.05453] [-3.26278] [ 0.55114] [-0.47350] 
Migration (-1) -0.004603 -0.000432  0.005617 -0.002212  0.001773  0.000571 -0.000320  0.011624 -0.318387  0.000537 
 [-2.37991] [-0.22792] [ 1.22327] [-0.46684] [ 1.78008] [ 1.25111] [-0.35585] [ 2.75759] [-1.58733] [ 0.44722] 
Migration (-2) -0.002104 -0.001907  0.000889 -0.005583  0.000711 -5.92E-05  0.001447 -0.004274 -0.127276 -0.001582 
 [-0.83077] [-0.76899] [ 0.14786] [-0.90010] [ 0.54540] [-0.09921] [ 1.22759] [-0.77435] [-0.48460] [-1.00515] 
Real GDP growth rate (-1)  0.157528  0.553548  0.704719  1.521303 -0.058982 -0.159863 -0.111501  3.438205 -49.26150  0.529351 
 [ 0.36686] [ 1.31666] [ 0.69127] [ 1.44635] [-0.26664] [-1.57895] [-0.55789] [ 3.67350] [-1.10613] [ 1.98385] 
Real GDP growth rate (-2) -0.275083  0.332586  1.159767  0.292550 -0.442100  0.055995 -0.399803  2.239834 82.70824 -0.140640 
 [-0.64738] [ 0.79943] [ 1.14964] [ 0.28107] [-2.01971] [ 0.55889] [-2.02151] [ 2.41837] [1.87675] [-0.53264] 
C  2.746203  3.266345  4.639957  12.12931 -0.293385 -0.109092  1.031061  0.205140 -186.9375  2.511178 
 [ 1.65369] [ 2.00892] [ 1.17687] [ 2.98178] [-0.34295] [-0.27861] [ 1.33394] [ 0.05667] [-1.08537] [ 2.43347] 
D1 -2.049651 -2.080791 -1.088808 -0.436609  0.221259  0.244765 -0.660718  4.492503 60.68565 -1.600103 
 [-1.54625] [-1.60327] [-0.34597] [-0.13447] [ 0.32402] [ 0.78312] [-1.07090] [ 1.55488] [0.44141] [-1.94256] 
D2 -2.409195 -1.074419 -0.550097 -3.753115  0.308651  0.006095 -0.030289 -1.325086 53.70672 -0.910865 
 [-2.25895] [-1.02893] [-0.21725] [-1.43663] [ 0.56179] [ 0.02424] [-0.06102] [-0.57002] [0.48554] [-1.37440] 
D3 -0.987060 -1.075185  0.688853 -7.075742  0.766963  0.196036 -1.190350  0.116616 195.4691 -1.707793 
 [-0.80656] [-0.89734] [ 0.23709] [-2.36039] [ 1.21657] [ 0.67937] [-2.08978] [ 0.04372] [1.54004] [-2.24571] 
 R-squared  0.558209  0.455989  0.451073  0.770726  0.765283  0.740504  0.847366  0.850873  0.629989  0.627708 
 Adj. R-squared  0.074342 -0.139832 -0.150133  0.519617  0.508213  0.456293  0.680195  0.687544  0.224738  0.219960 
 F-statistic  1.153641  0.765311  0.750280  3.069287  2.976939  2.605476  5.068870  5.209561  1.554566  1.539450 
Log likelihood -47.76547 -46.81446 -86.67405 -88.08068 -17.91664  17.25170 -13.35120 -82.82827 -256.6395 -26.35564 
Akaike AIC  3.189576  3.147309  4.918847  4.981364  1.862962  0.299924  1.660053  4.747923  12.47287  2.238028 
Schwarz SC  4.153130  4.110863  5.882400  5.944917  2.826515  1.263478  2.623606  5.711476  13.43642  3.201582 
Mean dependent  0.757778  0.680000  0.757778  1.135556  0.042222  0.008889  2.582222  0.582222  17.72712 0.551661 
 
